Access Control for Monitoring
System-Spanning Business Processes in Proviado

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Abstract: Integrated process support is highly desirable in environments where data related to a particular (business) process are scattered over distributed, heterogeneous information systems (IS). A process monitoring component is a much-needed module in order to provide an integrated view on all these process data. Regarding process data integration, access control (AC) issues are very important but also quite complex to be addressed. A major problem arises from the fact that the involved IS are usually based on heterogeneous AC components. For several reasons, the only feasible way to tackle the problem of AC at the process monitoring level is to define access rights for the process monitoring component, hence getting rid of the burden to map access rights from the IS level. This paper discusses requirements for AC in process monitoring, which we derived from our case studies in the automotive domain. It then presents alternative approaches for AC: the view-based and the object-based approach. The latter is retained, and a core AC model is proposed for the definition of access rights that meet the derived requirements. AC mechanisms provided within the core model are key ingredients for the definition of model extensions.

1 Introduction

In order to streamline their way of doing business, today’s companies are dealing with a number of processes involving different domains, organizations, and groups. As discussed in [BRB05], an integrated process support is highly desirable in such an environment where data (e.g., audit trails and reports) related to a particular process (instance), and with different degrees of sensitivity, are often scattered over heterogeneous information systems (IS) (cf. Fig. 1). A process monitoring component is a much-needed module in order to provide an integrated view on all these data [JHBK04, Mue01]. Despite its importance, many existing process-aware IS [Wes07] do not offer such a component. Specifically, a process monitoring component is responsible for displaying the status of process instances, for dispatching specific activities to corresponding actors, and so on.

Different user groups or roles (e.g., technicians, managers) usually have different perspectives over processes and related data. Therefore, adequate views need to be provided [BRB07]. This is of particular importance when dealing with complex, long-running busi-
ness processes with dozens up to thousands activities. In the context of process data integration and process monitoring [JHBK04], in addition, access control (AC) issues are very important to be addressed. However, a major problem is that involved IS are usually based on different AC components implying facts such as 1) heterogeneity regarding the meta-models based on which organizational models and related access rights are defined (e.g., users/groups and actors/roles), 2) different notions for the same entity/entity type (e.g., user and actor), and 3) non-registration of particular user(s) in all of the involved IS.

To preserve integrity of AC information, AC constraints applied at the process monitoring level should be consistent with the constraints set out by the different IS. However, it has turned out that the integration of heterogeneous AC components is difficult to achieve for several reasons: 1) Access rights are not always explicitly described, but might be “hard-coded”, and hence difficult to retrieve; 2) AC modules do not always provide interfaces (i.e., APIs) in order to facilitate the access to information about AC rules (“black-box” AC modules); and 3) Rights at the IS level mainly deal with process definition and execution, and have been not designed for the monitoring of process data by different users. Process definition and execution require administration rights, permissions to create new instances, delegation rights, rights to work on specific activities, and rights to change processes [WRWR05]. By contrast, monitoring requires rights to visualize specific process activities, to display specific activity attributes, or to show different abstractions on a process (cf. Fig. 2a+b). Taking this into account, the only feasible way to tackle the problem of AC at the process monitoring level is to (re-)define AC rights for the process monitoring component, hence getting rid of the burden to inherit AC rights from the IS level. Of course, if possible, existing AC rights at the IS level should be automatically mapped to the ones at the process monitoring level, but we cannot assume this in general. Explicitly, specifying AC rights at the monitoring level also makes it possible to define them at a finer-grained level when compared with what is already defined at the IS level.
This paper discusses requirements relevant for the definition of such AC rights. These requirements have resulted from case studies we conducted in the automotive domain. We propose approaches for AC, mainly a view-based and an object-based one. The retained solution (i.e., the object-based approach) is used as backbone in order to provide a comprehensive core AC model. This model allows for the (compact) definition of AC rights at a fine-grained level. Moreover, AC rights are meant to meet the spectrum of confidentiality possibly defined on process data. Proposed AC mechanisms will be key ingredients in future definitions of extended AC models for process monitoring.

Section 2 discusses basic notions by distinguishing between model and instance level. Section 3 exposes the major requirements identified. Two alternative approaches for AC are studied and compared in Section 4. In Section 5, we introduce our logical AC model. Section 6 discusses related work and Section 7 concludes with a summary and an outlook.

2 Basic Considerations

Generally, we distinguish between model and instance level (cf. Fig. 2). The former gathers different kinds of enterprise models such as organizational models, functional models, data models, IT-system models, and process models. Each of the first four models gives input to the process model defined as a set of one or more linked activities, which collectively realize a business objective. Specifically, these activities are carried out, in a coordinated way, by different processing entities (incl. humans and software systems) to reach a goal, such as changing the design of a car, delivering merchandise, or operating a patient. User- and pre-defined attributes may be associated with process models or activities (e.g., costs, needed resources). Examples of frameworks supporting the integrated modeling of the different enterprise aspects include ARIS and Adonis.

In Proviado [BRB05, BBR06, BRB07], at the model level, we focus on the secure visualization of data related to a particular process model. Other kinds of models have not been considered for visualization yet, but will be added later on. Different types of data may be involved in a process model such as process relevant data and application data [Wes07]. We are particularly interested in providing a secure way to visualize application data. These data are in general strictly managed by the application(s) supporting the process model. At the instance level, we focus on the secure monitoring of running process instances. A process instance is defined as the representation of a single enactment of a process model (i.e., a concrete business case) [Wes07]. Concepts such as user worklists (i.e., lists of work items derived from process instance activities), activity execution state (e.g., Running), and activity execution cost are associated with the instance level.

At model and instance levels, different kinds of rights need to be defined; e.g., administration rights, data access rights, permission to create instances from a given process model, rights to execute a particular work item, or delegation rights. At the model (instance) level, the visualization (monitoring) of user-adapted views derived from specific process models

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1In the Proviado project [BRB05, BBR06, BRB07], we are aiming to propose a solution for visualizing in a secure way data related to a particular process or to a collection of processes.
(instances) is required. These views must take into account access rights of the involved user. Access rights may be defined on different aspects related to the model and instance levels; e.g., process model, activity, process instance, activity instance, data elements, predefined and user-defined attributes, attribute current value, and attribute history.

3 Access Control Major Requirements

We conducted case studies in the automotive domain in which we studied processes like car engineering, change management (cf. Fig. 3a) and release management. As fruit of these case studies, we derived major requirements for AC in process monitoring.

Requirement 1 (Definition of AC rights at a fine-grained level). AC rights for process monitoring should meet the spectrum of confidentiality defined on data related to a particular process. Moreover, they should be definable on different aspects/objects of the model and instance levels (e.g., the process itself and its activities, attributes, and data elements).

*Requirement 1.1 (Meeting a spectrum of confidentiality). A distinction should be made between at least three levels of confidentiality: a first level in which all available information can be accessed, a second one where only high-level information can be accessed, and a third one where no information is available at all. Considering the process of managing change requests (cf. Fig. 3a), for example, we may think about a (pre-defined) attribute e.g., activity cost) associated with a specific activity (e.g., generate expertise). Such an activity may require a “two days by person” cost to be accomplished. One may have the right to access this information (i.e., the exact value of the attribute), to access abstracted information such as “less than one week (i.e., less than five days by person)”, or to access nothing.
The spectrum of confidentiality may also be restricted to only two levels: “give” or “don’t give information”. In change management for example, an external partner may design part of the car; internally, a verification of this component may be done before it is integrated with the overall design of the car. The external partner might or might not have the right to know about the existence of the verification activities.

- Requirement 1.2 (AC rights definable on different objects of the model / instance levels). We define “object” as entity of a process model / instance; e.g., an expertise document produced as output of a generate expertise activity is considered as data object. The generate expertise activity itself as well as the change request (CR) process model are considered as two different objects. Moreover, a group of objects is also an object; e.g., AC rights may be defined 1) on all running CR process instances, or 2) on specific ones.

![Figure 3: Automotive Domain – (a) Simplified Process of Dealing with Change Requests (CR), (b) Different Views on CR Process](image)

**Requirement 2 (Definition of static AC rights).** We distinguish between “static” AC rights that are independent from the execution of a process instance, and “dynamic” AC rights for which this is not the case. The latter are based on elements such as activity status and control principles (e.g., separation of duties, dual control, and inter-case constraints) [SM02, BE01]. Regarding our CR process, a person from a specific department (e.g., mo-
tor eng.) responsible for generating expertise might not be allowed to access the expertise document generated by the other departments (car body eng. and electronic eng.) unless she finishes generating her own expertise. This paper focuses on static AC rights.

Requirement 3 (Usability and maintainability of AC rights). AC rights should be simple to define and easy to maintain. As discussed in [TAP05], a challenge is to balance collaboration and flexibility; i.e., we need to ensure that the advantages provided by process-aware IS are not reduced by AC rights too rigidly defined. For this purpose, abstractions are required at the objects’ level. In order to specify AC rights at different levels of granularity, we need to define hierarchies on objects; e.g., it might be reasonable to authorize a manager to access all running CR process instances. However, regular users might only have access to specific CR instances (e.g., CR initiators only have the right to access CR process instances that correspond to change requests initiated by them).

Table 1 gathers major requirements identified. The ones highlighted (i.e., R1, R2, and R3) are addressed by the solution proposed in Section 5.

Table 1: Access Control Major Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirements</th>
<th>Requirements’ description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R1</td>
<td>Definition of AC rights at a fine-grained level</td>
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<tr>
<td>R1.1</td>
<td>Meeting a spectrum of confidentiality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1.2</td>
<td>AC rights definable on diff. aspects of the mod./inst. levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>Definition of static AC rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>R3</td>
<td>Usability and maintainability of AC rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R4</td>
<td>Definition of dynamic AC rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>R5</td>
<td>Definition of AC rights on the visualization of a collection of processes</td>
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<tr>
<td>R6</td>
<td>Definition of AC rights for the look-ahead problem</td>
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<tr>
<td>R7</td>
<td>Completeness of the AC component</td>
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</table>

4 Candidate Solution Approaches for Access Control

Among a list of possible AC approaches, we feature two candidate solutions that we study and compare: the view- and the object-based approach. In both approaches we follow the main idea proposed by a generalized AC approach; i.e., RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) [FSG01], in which AC rights are not directly linked to concrete users, but to roles. The view-based approach consists of defining one basic view per user role; this view implicitly reflects the AC rights of the role over a process by only showing the information to be accessed by users with the respective role. The object-based approach consists of defining, for each role, AC rights on the different aspects of a process (e.g., activity, activity attributes, process instance). Section 4.1 illustrates the two featured approaches. Section 4.2 then summarizes their advantages and drawbacks. This helps us to clearly motivate the object-based approach as the one retained and elaborated in the following.

4.1 Description of Solution Approaches

View-based Approach. Considering a particular process model such as the CR process (cf. Fig. 3a), a number of views could be (manually) defined on this process. Each of them would then reflect the information accessible for users with a particular role. Access rights
over the process may be derived implicitly from each view. Suppose the following views
are defined on the CR process (cf. Fig. 3b): (View 1) High-level view on CR process,
(View 2) View on expertise activities of CR process, and (View 3) View on request
activities of CR process. Then one basic view per role may be defined: (“general man-
ager”, View 1), (“CR manager”, View 2), and (“engineer”, View 3). Each of the views
implicitly reflects the read access rights of the particular role:

- A general manager may access high-level activities like initiation, expertise,
evaluation, commenting, and so on.
- CR managers may access activities request expertise, request evaluation,
request comments, instruct realization, and conclude CR.
- Engineers may access concrete activities request expertise and generate
expertise.

Object-based Approach. It consists of explicitly defining an extensible set of access
rights for each role:

- (“general manager”, {initiation, expertise, evaluation, commenting,
approval, realization, conclusion}, Read)
- (“CR manager”, {request expertise, request evaluation, request
comments, instruct realization, conclude CR}, Read)
- (“engineer”, {request expertise, generate expertise}, Read)

A view may then be generated for a specific user based on the access rights associated with
the role(s) played by this user. As an example, a view such as View 3 illustrated in Fig. 3b
would be generated for motor engineer John Smith.

4.2 Solution Approaches: Advantages and Drawbacks

View-based Approach. The most obvious advantage comes from the fact that an existing
concept (e.g., View Definition Language [Bob08]) can be explicitly reused in order to
reflect the access rights over processes. Hence, there is no need for defining a new AC
language assuming that the process-aware IS clearly supports a View Definition Language
[Bob08]). However, three drawbacks can be identified:

Costly maintenance of views: Consider a process model P together with the views derived
from it. Suppose a modification is brought to P: (1) the views affected by this change have
to be identified possibly among a large number of existing views; (2) the identified views
have to be adapted to reflect the change of P. This adaptation should be done without any
failure; (3) the adapted views imply an implicit modification over AC rights.

Complexity of views combination: Since a user may play more than one role (e.g., John
Smith being a general manager as well as a motor engineer), we must be able to combine
multiple views (e.g., View 1 and View 3). The resulting view, automatically generated or
manually modeled out of multiple views, will be shown to the user. On the one hand, we are facing a combinatorial problem (i.e., the different ways of arranging views in order to combine them). On the other hand, conflicts may exist between access rights reflected by the views to be combined. Such conflicts, first, must be detected, and second, be solved, probably by applying specific conflict resolution policies [dVSJ05, JSSS01].

Occurrence of redundant information due to lack of abstraction: Suppose that a specific role $R$ has access, among other things, to a specific activity $A$ in all processes involving $A$. Using the view-based approach, this access right would be reflected by showing $A$ within all the views respectively defined on the processes containing $A$. This leads to redundant information due to the definition of access rights at the level of process models, not involving functional models (cf. Sect. 2). The redundancy of information is an issue not only for the view-based approach, but for other approaches as well, as long as the notion of abstraction is missing (e.g., at the level of activities). However, redundancy has more impact in conjunction with the view-based approach than in conjunction with the object-based one.

Object-based Approach. The main advantage of this approach is threefold. Indeed, the drawbacks identified for the view-based approach appear to be advantages here. First, there is no maintenance of views; the cost behind the maintenance operation is abolished. Second, views have not to be combined and hence the complexity behind this operation does not exist. Third, if it is possible to define different levels of abstractions on objects, this will reduce redundancy when specifying access rights. The object-based approach may be criticized for not being intuitive since AC rights, instead of basic views, are initially defined for each role. However when compared with the drawbacks of the view-based approach, we voluntarily accept this only criticism, and select the object-based approach in order to elaborate the core solution for our logical AC model.

Table 2 summarizes the most important criteria that play either in favor of or against each of the considered approaches. As we can see, among five criteria, three play in favor of the object-based approach, while only one criterion plays in favor of the view-based approach.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria/Approaches</th>
<th>View-based</th>
<th>Object-based</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ease of AC rights definition</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ease of AC rights maintenance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ease of conflicts resolution</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ease of AC rights combination</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redundancy-free</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This criterion is reduced to the “Ease of conflicts resolution” criterion

5 An Access Control Model

An AC model for process monitoring must allow to restrict access to authorized users only. Sect. 5.1 presents our formal framework for defining and manipulating AC rights. Sect. 5.2 and Sect. 5.3 discuss AC model extensions for coping with the problem of users playing multiple roles, and for addressing usability and maintainability issues.
5.1 Core AC Model

The specification of an AC module at the process monitoring level requires, first and foremost, the definition of access rights. A first step towards meeting Req. R1 (cf. Table 1) consists of defining access rights on attributes associated with specific process aspects that we call objects. Activities, process models or process instances are examples of accessed objects; attributes, indeed, reflect fine-grained characteristics of such objects. For this purpose, we first formally define the link between an object and its associated attributes.

**Definition 1 (Set of Attributes Associated with an Object)** Let ObjSet and AttSet respectively be the set of objects and the set of attributes involved in the process monitoring component. Then function attributeSet determines all attributes associated with an object obj ∈ ObjSet. Formally: attributeSet: ObjSet ↦ → AttSet with ∀att ∈ attributeSet(obj): att is a valid attribute defined on obj.

We associate with every object involved in the process monitoring component a set of attributes. Formally: ∀obj ∈ ObjSet: attributeSet(obj) ⊆ AttSet

In order to illustrate Def. 1, we reconsider the process from Fig. 3a. For the sake of simplicity, we only retain the concrete concept of activity instead of the generalized one of object. Let ObjSet = {request expertise, generate expertise, request evaluation, request comments, provide comments} be a set of activities involved in the CR process. Let further AttSet = {Att1, Att2, Att3, Att4, Att5} be the set of attributes involved in the CR process. Taking into account Def. 1, suppose that the set of attributes associated with each activity is captured as follows: attributeSet(req. expertise) = {Att1, Att3}; attributeSet(gen. expertise) = {Att1, Att2, Att4, Att5}; attributeSet(req. evaluation) = {Att1, Att3}; attributeSet(prov. evaluation) = {Att1, Att2, Att5}; attributeSet(req. comments) = {Att1, Att3}; attributeSet(prov. comments) = {Att1, Att2}. We may think of Att1 as the activity status that could take values from the set {NotActivated, Activated, Running, Completed, Skipped}. Att2 may be the starting date/time of an activity. Att3 could be the employee blacklist with possible values {Yes, No} specifying whether this list should be taken into account (or not) when employees are chosen to work on a specific task (e.g., generate expertise). If this list is taken into account, employees on black list may be excluded from those that may work on the task.

Based on Def. 1, we retain two types of information that may be checked/read: the existence and the value of an object’s attribute. We distinguish between two different spectra of confidentiality defined on this information: 1) “Allow”/“don’t allow” to check existence of an attribute within an object; 2) “Allow”/“don’t allow” to read the value of an attribute within an object, or allow to read another form of the value. From this we derive Def. 2.

**Definition 2 (Access Control on Existence/Value of Attribute)** Let (obj, att) (obj ∈ ObjSet, att ∈ attributeSet(obj)) denote an attribute att associated with object obj. Then Exist_{obj,att} determines whether it is allowed for someone (or not) to check the existence of attribute att within object obj; Val_{obj,att} determines whether it is allowed for someone
(or not) to read the value of attribute att within object obj. Formally:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Exist}_{\text{obj}, \text{att}} := \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if not allowed to check existence of att within obj} \\
1 & \text{if allowed to check existence of att within obj}
\end{cases} \\
\text{Val}_{\text{obj}, \text{att}} := \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if not allowed to read value of att within obj} \\
1 & \text{if allowed to read only another form of value} \\
2 & \text{if allowed to read value of att within obj}
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

Back to our example from Fig. 3a, suppose role “engineer” has the following access rights on the CR process: access to activities request expertise and generate expertise, access to the value of \(\text{Att}_1\) and to another form of the value of \(\text{Att}_2\), and access to the existence of \(\text{Att}_3\) within request expertise. Taking into account Def. 2, the AC on the existence/value of the different attributes can be captured as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Val}_{\text{generate expertise, Att}_1} &= 2, \quad \text{Val}_{\text{generate expertise, Att}_2} = 1, \\
\text{Val}_{\text{request expertise, Att}_1} &= 2, \quad \text{Exist}_{\text{request expertise, Att}_3} = 1
\end{align*}
\]

By default, we may suppose that the closed policy, considered as a classical approach for AC [Cas95], applies. If not specified otherwise:

\[
\text{Val}_{\text{obj, att}} = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Exist}_{\text{obj, att}} = 0, \quad \forall \text{ obj } \in \text{ObjSet}, \text{ att } \in \text{attributeSet(obj)}
\]

In this context, two classical approaches for AC are discussed in literature [Cas95]: closed policy where positive rights need to be specified explicitly, and open policy where negative rights need to be specified explicitly. The closed policy approach is known to ensure better protection than open policy. In the latter, the need for protection is not strong: by default, access is to be granted. Intuitively, we may also suppose that a specific operation prevails on another (cf. Fig. 4); e.g., whenever it is allowed to read the value of an attribute, this implies that it is also allowed to read another form of the value, and to check the existence of the attribute. Note that positive rights prevail on negative ones, i.e., positive rights are on bottom of the scale in Fig. 4. This is because of the closed policy adopted. Taking into account this scale, the following set of access rights is retained:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Val}_{\text{generate expertise, Att}_1} &= 2, \quad \text{Val}_{\text{generate expertise, Att}_2} = 1, \\
\text{Val}_{\text{request expertise, Att}_1} &= 2, \quad \text{Exist}_{\text{request expertise, Att}_3} = 1, \\
\text{Exist}_{\text{generate expertise, Att}_4} &= 0, \quad \text{Exist}_{\text{generate expertise, Att}_5} = 0, \\
\text{Exist}_{\text{Activity, Attribute}} = 0, \quad &\forall \text{ Activity } \in \text{ObjSet} \setminus \{\text{request expertise, generate expertise}\}, \quad \text{Attribute } \in \text{attributeSet(Activity)}
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 4: Prevailment of Access Rights
AC rights being clearly defined, we present now a mechanism consisting of two functions that respectively return 1) whether or not an attribute is associated with an object, 2) the exact value or an abstraction of the value of an attribute.

**Definition 3 (Existence/Value of Attribute)** Let \((\text{obj}, \text{att}) (\text{obj} \in \text{ObjSet}, \text{att} \in \text{attributeSet(\text{obj})})\) be an attribute associated with an object. Let \(\text{Val}\) be a function on \(\text{ObjSet} \times \text{AttSet}, \text{Val}: \text{ObjSet} \times \text{AttSet} \mapsto \text{Dom}_{\text{AttSet}} \cup \{\text{Undefined}\}\). \(\text{Val}\) reflects for each \((\text{obj}, \text{att}) \in \text{ObjSet} \times \text{AttSet}\) its current value from domain \(\text{Dom}_{\text{AttSet}}\) or the value “Undefined” if att has not been written yet. Let \(\text{FunctionSet}\) be the set of functions that can be applied on the value of an attribute in order to provide another form of this value. For defining the specific function that can be applied on a specific attribute, we need the function:

\[fa: \text{ObjSet} \times \text{AttSet} \mapsto \text{FunctionSet} \cup \{\text{Undefined}\}\]

which maps each couple \((\text{obj}, \text{att}) \in \text{ObjSet} \times \text{AttSet}\) to a specific function from \(\text{FunctionSet}\) or to “Undefined” if \(\text{att} \notin \text{attributeSet(\text{obj})}\) or no function is defined.

Then, \(f\) returns either the name of attribute \(\text{att}\) within object \(\text{obj}\), or “Undefined”; \(h\) determines either the value or another form of the value of attribute \(\text{att}\) within object \(\text{obj}\), or “Undefined”. Formally:

\[f: \text{ObjSet} \times \text{AttSet} \mapsto \text{AttSet} \cup \{\text{Undefined}\}\]

\[\text{with } f(\text{obj}, \text{att}) := \begin{cases} \text{att} & \text{if } \text{Exist}_{\text{obj}, \text{att}} = 1 \land \text{att} \in \text{attributeSet(\text{obj})} \\ \text{Undefined} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}\]

\[h: \text{ObjSet} \times \text{AttSet} \mapsto \text{Dom}_{\text{AttSet}} \cup \text{Dom}_{\text{FunctionSet}} \cup \{\text{Undefined}\}\]

\[\text{with } h(\text{obj}, \text{att}) := \begin{cases} \text{Undefined} & \text{if } \text{Val}_{\text{obj}, \text{att}} = 0 \\ fa(\text{obj}, \text{att})(\text{Val}(\text{obj}, \text{att})) & \text{if } \text{Val}_{\text{obj}, \text{att}} = 1 \\ \text{Val}(\text{obj}, \text{att}) & \text{if } \text{Val}_{\text{obj}, \text{att}} = 2 \end{cases}\]

\[\text{Dom}_{\text{AttSet}} = \bigcup_{\text{att} \in \text{AttSet}} \text{Dom}_{\text{att}}\]

\[\text{Dom}_{\text{FunctionSet}} = \bigcup_{\text{fct} \in \text{FunctionSet}} \text{Dom}_{\text{fct}}\]

If we go back to our example, applying Def. 3 would lead to the following existence/value of the different attributes:

\[h(\text{generate expertise}, \text{Att}_1) = \text{Val}(\text{generate expertise}, \text{Att}_1)\]

\[f(\text{generate expertise}, \text{Att}_1) = \text{Att}_1\]

\[h(\text{generate expertise}, \text{Att}_2) = fa(\text{generate expertise}, \text{Att}_2) \quad (\text{Val}(\text{generate expertise}, \text{Att}_2))\]

\[f(\text{generate expertise}, \text{Att}_2) = \text{Att}_2\]

\[h(\text{request expertise}, \text{Att}_1) = \text{Val}(\text{request expertise}, \text{Att}_1)\]

\[f(\text{request expertise}, \text{Att}_1) = \text{Att}_1\]

\[h(\text{request expertise}, \text{Att}_3) = \text{Undefined}\]
The result of applying Def. 3 on our CR process, taking into account specific access rights assigned to role “engineer”, is illustrated in Fig. 5.

5.2 Extended AC Model - Users Playing Multiple Roles

In this section, we recognize and point out the fact that a user may play more than one role leading to inconsistencies between the AC rights associated with each of the different roles. As example, a user may play roles “manager” and “engineer”. On the other hand, engineers may not be given access to private information. On the other hand, managers may need to access private documents, and access to such information may be given to them. In this context, a number of conflict resolution policies are discussed in literature [dVSJI05, JSSS01, FGS94, SD92]. None of them represents “the perfect solution”. Whichever policy we take, we will always find one situation for which it does not fit. [dVSJI05] states some problems of the different policies in conjunction with specific scenarios. Interestingly, conflicts may result either from explicitly defining negative AC rights, or from applying the closed policy. In the latter case, a simple solution approach may be to neglect negative AC rights derived from the used policy. Conflict resolution policies should be applied in the former case. For lack of space, we abstain from discussing this matter here.

5.3 Extended AC Model - Compact Definition of AC rights

So far, we have expressed that a certain attribute is allowed to be accessed (or not) within a certain object, particularly a certain activity. However, we must also be able to state within which processes this is allowed, i.e., what is the context of the AC to be defined. Candidates for the context are the entire process monitoring component (All), a group of process models, a particular process model, a group of process instances related to a particular process model, and a process instance.

The example elaborated in Section 5.1 presents a set of AC rights defined on a spe-
pecific process model: $CR_M$. We may think of the following representation: $(CR_M, \text{Val}_{\text{generate expertise}}, \text{Att}_1 = 2)$ stating that the value of $\text{Att}_1$ from activity $\text{generate expertise}$ is allowed to be read within process model $CR_M$. Suppose that AC rights are defined on a set of process models (e.g., $M_1$, $M_2$, $M_3$). This would lead to a set of couples: $(M_1, \text{Val}_{\text{generate expertise}}, \text{Att}_1 = 2)$, $(M_2, \text{Val}_{\text{generate expertise}}, \text{Att}_1 = 2)$, $(M_3, \text{Val}_{\text{generate expertise}}, \text{Att}_1 = 2)$. Hence, we recognize the need for abstraction at the objects’ level in order to compact the definition of AC rights reducing redundancy as much as possible. Therefore, one feasible way is to organize objects hierarchically (cf. Fig. 6): “All” at the top level, “Group of process models” at the next level down, “Process model” at the level just after, etc., and to propagate AC rights top-down. This allows us to meet the AC rights usability and maintainability requirement (cf. R3 in Table 1). Going back to our example, a group of process models $G_M = \{M_1, M_2, M_3\}$ would be defined, and the set of three couples would be reduced to the following couple: $(G_M, \text{Val}_{\text{generate expertise}}, \text{Att}_1 = 2)$. This approach would also simplify the definition of exceptions; e.g., it would be easy to express that no restrictions exist at all regarding accesses within any of the defined processes except the following: no accesses are allowed to activity $\text{approve CR}$ within the CR process model. This would be reduced to: $(\text{All}, \text{Val}_{\text{All}}, \text{Att}_1 = 2)$ (i.e., access is given to everything in order to bypass the closed policy), and $(CR_M, \text{Exist}_{\text{approve CR}}, \text{All} = 0)$ (i.e., access is retrieved from $\text{approve CR}$ within $CR_M$).

Figure 6: Objects’ Hierarchy

6 Related Work

The provision of adequate security mechanisms is indispensable for any IS. Particularly, in the context of process-aware IS such as ADEPT [RDB03], approaches have been proposed for dealing in a secure way with specific issues related to process management. As an example, Weber et al. propose an extension to RBAC in order to support process changes safely [WRWR05]. In the CEOSIS project, Rinderle and Reichert address changes that may occur within organizational structures [RMR07]. They discuss how to support such changes, and how to adapt access rules when the underlying organizational model is changed [RMR08, RMR09]. However, to our best knowledge, no research work has yet addressed the problem of fine-grained AC in conjunction with process data integration and process monitoring [Mue01, JHBK04]. This also applies in respect to existing process performance management tools (e.g., ARIS PPM).

Some of the aspects retained in this paper have already been introduced by others. The fine-grained control was discussed in [TAP05] as one of the collaborative environment
factors that determine the usability of a specific AC model. The authors argue that it is not sufficient to define AC rules only for groups of users on clusters of objects. A user might need a specific permission on an instance of an object at a particular point (i.e., time) in the collaboration session. In our approach, we were more explicit when defining AC rights at a fine-grained level: 1) we introduced the spectrum of confidentiality concept that would reflect the “specific” permission to grant or to revoke, and 2) we hierarchized objects such that AC rights may be defined in a compact way on the different aspects of the process model and instances. In [TAP05], no details are given regarding time (i.e., a permission is valid only for a specific time space). This is an interesting point to be further investigated. In the context of adaptive process-aware IS, Weber et al. propose the definition of process type dependent AC rights [WRWR05]. Only change commands that are useful within a particular context are allowed. This idea can be compared to our approach of specifying the context of an AC right. However, both approaches focus on different aims. [WRWR05] provides assistance for users when performing a change, whereas in this paper, the context notion is used for defining AC rights in a more focused way. We refer to [KR09, RMR09] for discussions of other AC frameworks in process-aware IS.

7 Summary and Outlook

We identified AC requirements in the context of process monitoring. We then presented possible solution approaches for major requirements, and we motivated the objects-based approach that we used for proposing a core AC model for process monitoring. Two extensions to this model were also discussed: the first one deals with the problems that may appear when a single user plays more than one role; the second extension introduces the “context” notion and discusses the compact definition of AC rights taking into account a defined objects’ hierarchy. Major requirements were addressed using the proposed AC model and its extensions. In future work, we will address requirements R4-7 (cf. Table 1). Our research work will also include the investigation of advanced issues such as the aggregation and the definition of AC rights on data elements and other process aspects.

References


